▶ JOKE MEHEUS, *An Adaptive Logic for Normative Conflicts.*
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The aim of this paper is to present a new paraconsistent deontic logic (called **MI**) and its adaptive version $\mathbf{MI^m}$. The monotonic logic **MI** is based on an extremely weak paraconsistent logic, with gluts for the negation, gaps for the disjunction, and gluts as well as gaps for the conjunction. As a result, the principle of 'modal inheritance' (if $\vdash A \supset B$ then $\vdash OA \supset OB$) is invalid in **MI**. So are each of the following rules: $OA, OB \nvdash_{\mathbf{MI}} O(A \wedge B)$. $O(A \wedge B) \nvdash_{\mathbf{MI}} OA$, and $OA \nvdash_{\mathbf{MI}} O(A \vee B)$.

In the adaptive logic $\mathbf{MI^m}$, the principle of modal inheritance as well as the above mentioned rules are valid for all obligations that behave consistently. When applied to a set of premises that is consistent, $\mathbf{MI^m}$ yields all consequences of Standard Deontic Logic. When applied to a set of premises that is inconsistent, the set of consequences is "as rich as possible" without any form of deontic explosion being validated.

I shall present both the semantics and the proof theory of $\mathbf{MI^m}$. The proof theory is dynamical (conclusions derived at some stage of a proof may be rejected at a later stage), but is sound and complete with respect to the (static) semantics. I shall argue that $\mathbf{MI^m}$ has several advantages as compared to the existing systems. I shall also show that $\mathbf{MI^m}$ leads to the desired results for the examples described in the literature. For instance, in the case of Horty's Smith example, $\mathbf{MI^m}$ enables one to derive OS from $O(F \vee S)$ and $O\neg F$, and in the case of Goble's Jones example OS is $\mathbf{MI^m}$ -derivable from $O(T \wedge (F \vee S))$ and $O\neg(T \vee F)$. As Goble observes in [1], none of the currently available deontic systems adequately solves the latter problem. $\mathbf{MI^m}$ moreover has the nice property that, whenever OA and OB are mutually incompatible, $O(A \vee B)$ is derivable from them.

[1] LOU GOBLE, *Normative Conflicts and the Logic of Ought.* To appear.