The School of Philosophy, Anthropology and Social Inquiry Philosophy

Associate Professor Howard Sankey

Howard Sankey studied philosophy at the University of Otago before undertaking a PhD in philosophy of science at the University of Melbourne. He has held visiting positions at Saint David's University College, Lampeter, the Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, the Center for Philosophy and Ethics of Science, University of Hanover, the Poincaré Archives at the University of Nancy and the University of Hyderabad. His interests fall in the overlap between general philosophy of science and adjacent areas of philosophy such as epistemology, metaphysics and the philosophy of mind and language. He has worked on such topics as incommensurability, relativism, scientific theory change, epistemology of science and the debate between scientific realism and anti-realism. His major publications include the books, The Incommensurability Thesis, Rationality, Relativism and Incommensurability, and Scientific Realism and the Rationality of Science. He has edited or co-edited several volumes, Causation and Laws of Nature, After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend (with Robert Nola), Incommensurability and Related Matters (with Paul Hoyningen-Huene) and Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison (with Lena Soler and Paul Hoyningen-Huene). A book jointly authored with Robert Nola entitled Theories of Scientific Method: An Introduction was published late 2007. He edits the categories on Scientific Change and Scientific Language for philpapers: online research in philosophy, as well as a number of fields which include Incommensurability in science, Meaning change and conceptual change and Reference in science.

 

Metaphysics of Science Conference: Click here for information about a conference that was held at the University of Melbourne 2-5 July 2009.

 

Class Websites:

 

Contact details:

Rm 118 Old Quad
School of Philosophy, Anthropology and Social Inquiry
The University of Melbourne
VIC 3010 Australia

T: (03) 8344 6558
E: chs at unimelb.edu.au

 

Online Papers:

'Incommensurability, Translation and Understanding', The Philosophical Quarterly 41: 165 (1991), pp. 414-426.

'Kuhn's Changing Concept of Incommensurability', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44: 4 (1993), pp. 775-791.

'The Problem of Rational Theory-Choice', Epistemologia 18: 2 (1995), pp. 299-312.

'Normative Naturalism and the Challenge of Relativism: Laudan versus Worrall on the Justification of Methodological Principles', International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10: 1 (1996), pp. 37-51.

'Incommensurability: The Current State of Play', Theoria 12: 3 (1997), pp. 425-445.

'Induction and Natural Kinds', Principia 1: 2 (1997), pp. 239-254.

'Taxonomic Incommensurability', International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12:1 (1998), pp. 7-16.

'Incommensurability - An Overview', Divinatio 10 (1999), pp. 1-13.

'Methodological Pluralism, Normative Naturalism and the Realist Aim of Science', in After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend, pp. 211-229.

'The Language of Science: Meaning Variance and Theory Comparison', Language Sciences 22 (2000), pp. 117-136.

'Scientific Realism: An Elaboration And A Defence', Theoria 98 (2001), pp. 35-54.

'Realism, Method and Truth', in M. Marsonet (ed.), The Problem of Realism, Ashgate: Aldershot (2002), pp. 64-81.

'Qu'est-ce que le réalisme scientifique?', Reseaux 94-95-96 (2002), pp. 69-82.

'Scientific Realism and the God's Eye Point of View', Epistemologia XXVII (2004), pp. 211-226.

'Why Is It Rational To Believe Scientific Theories Are True?', in C. Cheyne & J. Worrall (eds.), Rationality and Reality: Conversations with Alan Musgrave, Springer: Dordrecht, 2006, pp. 109-132.

'Scientific Realism and the Inevitability of Science', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 39: 2 (2008), pp. 259-264.

'Semantic Incommensurability and Scientific Realism'

'Azande Witchcraft, Epistemological Relativism and the Problem of the Criterion'

 


List of Publications:

  1. 'In Defence of Untranslatability', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 68: 1 (1990), pp. 1-21.
  2. 'Translation Failure Between Theories', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 22: 2 (1991), pp. 223-236.
  3. 'Incommensurability, Translation and Understanding', The Philosophical Quarterly 41: 165 (1991), pp. 414-426.
  4. 'Feyerabend and the Description Theory of Reference', Journal of Philosophical Research XVI (1991), 223-232.
  5. 'Incommensurability and the Indeterminacy of Translation', Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69: 2 (1991), pp. 219-223.
  6. Cockburn, D., & Sankey, H., 'A Dialogue on Scientific Rationality', Cogito 5: 3 (1991), pp. 135-140.
  7. 'Translation and Languagehood', Philosophia, 21: 3-4 (1992), pp. 335-337.
  8. Cockburn, D., & Sankey, H., 'A Dialogue on Scientific Realism', Cogito 6: 3 (1992), pp. 163-169.
  9. Review of Brian Ellis Truth and Objectivity and Paul Horwich Truth, The Philosophical Quarterly 42: 169 (1992), pp. 496-9.
  10. 'Kuhn's Changing Concept of Incommensurability', British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44: 4 (1993), pp. 775-791.
  11. 'Kuhn's Model of Scientific Theory Change', Cogito 7: 1 (1993), pp. 18-24.
  12. 'Five Varieties of Cognitive Relativism', Cogito 7: 2 (1993), pp. 106-111.
  13. Review of Alan Chalmers Science and its Fabrication, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71: 2 (1993), pp. 218-220.
  14. Review of Clark Glymour Thinking Things Through, Metascience 4 (1993), pp. 110-112.
  15. The Incommensurability Thesis, Avebury Series in Philosophy of Science, Avebury: Aldershot (1994), 227 pages.
  16. Bowker, G., & Sankey, H., 'Truth and Reality in Social Constructivism', Arena Journal 2 (1993/94), pp. 233-252.
  17. 'Judgement and Rational Theory-Choice', Methodology and Science 27: 3 (1994), pp. 167-182.
  18. 'Relativism and Epistemological Anarchism', Cogito 8: 2 (1994), pp. 158-164.
  19. Bowker, G., & Sankey, H., 'Scientific Rationality versus Social Construction', Cogito 8: 1 (1994), pp. 39-45.
  20. Review of Donald Gillies Philosophy of Science in the Twentieth Century: Four Central Themes, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72: 3 (1994), pp. 395-396.
  21. Note of John Wright Science and the Theory of Rationality, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72: 1 (1994), pp. 131-132.
  22. Note of Paul Feyerabend Against Method (3rd edition), Australasian Journal of Philosophy 72: 3 (1994), p. 406.
  23. 'The Problem of Rational Theory-Choice', Epistemologia 18: 2 (1995), pp. 299-312.
  24. 'The Semantic Stance of Scientific Entity Realism', Philosophia 24: 3-4 (1995), pp. 405-415.
  25. Cockburn, D., & Sankey, H., 'Depression and Science', Cogito 9: 1 (1995), pp. 67-72.
  26. Review of Paul Hoyningen-Huene Reconstructing Scientific Revolutions: Thomas S. Kuhn's Philosophy of Science, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73: 3 (1995), pp. 487-489.
  27. Review of Paul Horwich (ed.), World Changes: Thomas Kuhn and the Nature of Science, Metascience 8 (1995), pp. 140-142.
  28. Note of Jerrold Aronson, Rom Harré and Eileen Way, Realism Rescued, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73: 1 (1995), p. 172.
  29. 'Normative Naturalism and the Challenge of Relativism: Laudan versus Worrall on the Justification of Methodological Principles', International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10: 1 (1996), pp. 37-51.
  30. 'Rationality, Relativism and Methodological Pluralism', Explorations in Knowledge XIII: 1 (1996), pp. 18-36.
  31. 'Popper's Meta-methodological Conventionalism and the Turn to Naturalism', Preprint 6/96, Victorian Centre for the History and Philosophy of Science Preprint Series, pp. 1-22.
  32. Interview of Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Metascience 10 (1996), pp. 59-70.
  33. Review of David Miller, Critical Rationalism: A Restatement and Defence, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74: 2 (1996), pp. 387-389.
  34. Rationality, Relativism and Incommensurability. Avebury Series in Philosophy, Ashgate: Aldershot (1997), 210 pages.
  35. 'Il Problema dell' incommensurabilità delle teorie scientifiche', Nuova Secondaria 5: 15 (1997), pp. 61-66.
  36. Note of Peter Lipton (ed.), Theory, Evidence and Explanation, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 75: 1 (1997), pp. 138.
  37. Sawyer, K. R., Beed, C., &. Sankey, H., 'Underdetermination in Economics: The Duhem-Quine Thesis', Economics and Philosophy 13 (1997), pp. 1-23.
  38. 'Kuhn's Ontological Relativism', in D. Ginev & R. S. Cohen (eds.), Issues and Images in the Philosophy of Science, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 192, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht, 1997, pp. 305-320. (Reprinted in Science & Education 9 (2000), pp. 59-75.)
  39. 'Scientific Realism and the Problem of Progress', Cogito 11: 2 (1997), pp. 88-93.
  40. 'Van Fraassen's Constructive Empiricism', Cogito 11: 3 (1997), pp. 157-163.
  41. 'Incommensurability: The Current State of Play', Theoria 12: 3 (1997), pp. 425-445.
  42. 'Induction and Natural Kinds', Principia 1: 2 (1997), pp. 239-254.
  43. 'Taxonomic Incommensurability', International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 12:1 (1998), pp. 7-16.
  44. 'Hilary Putnam's Internal Realism', Cogito 12: 1 (1998), pp. 33-39.
  45. 'Lakatos's Idea of Scientific Research Programs', in G. Good (ed.), Sciences of the Earth: An Encyclopedia of Events, People, and Phenomena, Volume 2, Garland: New York (1998), pp. 499-502.
  46. 'Objectivity and Relativism in Science', Ormond Papers 16 (1999), pp. 91-100.
  47. 'Incommensurability - An Overview', Divinatio 10 (1999), pp. 1-13.
  48. 'The Theory-Dependence of Observation', Cogito 13: 3 (1999), pp. 207-212.
  49. H. Sankey (ed.), Causation and Laws of Nature, Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science , Volume 14, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht (1999), 358 pages.
  50. Editor's Introduction, Causation and Laws of Nature, xi-xvi.
  51. R. Nola & H. Sankey (eds.), After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Recent Issues in Theories of Scientific Method, Australasian Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Volume 15, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht (2000), 252 pages.
  52. Nola, R. & Sankey, H., 'Introduction', in After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend, xi-xix.
  53. Nola, R. & Sankey, H., 'A Selective Survey of Theories of Scientific Method', in After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend, pp. 1-65.
  54. 'Methodological Pluralism, Normative Naturalism and the Realist Aim of Science', in After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend, pp. 211-229.
  55. 'The Language of Science: Meaning Variance and Theory Comparison', Language Sciences 22 (2000), pp. 117-136.
  56. 'Est-il rationnel de chercher la vérité?', Revue Philosophique de Louvain 98: 3 (2000), pp. 589-602.
  57. 'What is Scientific Realism?', Divinatio 12 (2000), pp. 103-120. (Reprinted in Ormond Papers XVII (2000), pp. 27-42.)
  58. P. Hoyningen-Huene & H. Sankey (eds.), Incommensurability and Related Matters, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science , Volume 216, Kluwer Academic Publishers: Dordrecht (2001), 325 pages.
  59. Sankey, H. & Hoyningen-Huene, P., 'Introduction', in Incommensurability and Related Matters, vii-xxxiv.
  60. 'Scientific Realism: An Elaboration And A Defence', Theoria 98 (2001), pp. 35-54. (Reprinted in M. Carrier, J. Roggenhofer, G. Küppers & P. Blanchard (eds.), Knowledge and the World: Challenges Beyond the Science Wars, Springer-Verlag: Berlin & Heidelberg, 2004, pp. 55-74.)
  61. Sankey, H. & Hoyningen-Huene, P., Review of T.S. Kuhn, The Road Since Structure, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2002), pp. 137-142.
  62. 'Realism, Method and Truth', in M. Marsonet (ed.), The Problem of Realism, Ashgate: Aldershot (2002), pp. 64-81.
  63. Review of Alexander Bird, Thomas Kuhn, The Philosophical Quarterly 52: 209 (2002), pp. 654-657.
  64. 'Qu'est-ce que le réalisme scientifique?', Reseaux 94-95-96 (2002), pp. 69-82. [Translation of (57)]
  65. Book reconsidered, Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 36: 6 (2002), pp. 821-824.
  66. Review of Thomas Nickles (ed.) Thomas Kuhn, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2003.03.07
  67. Comment on Holm Tetens' 'Scientific Objectivity with a Human Face', in M. Carrier, J. Roggenhofer, G. Küppers & P. Blanchard (eds.), Knowledge and the World: Challenges Beyond the Science Wars, Springer-Verlag: Berlin & Heidelberg, 2004, pp. 95-98.
  68. Note of John Dupré Humans and other Animals, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82: 2 (2004), pp. 367-8.
  69. 'Scientific Realism and the God's Eye Point of View', Epistemologia XXVII (2004), pp. 211-226.
  70. 'Realism Without Limits', Divinatio 20 (2004), pp. 145-165.
  71. 'Incommensurability', in S. Sarkar & J. Pfeifer (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia: Volume 1, Routledge: New York, 2006, pp. 370-373.
  72. 'Why Is It Rational To Believe Scientific Theories Are True?', in C. Cheyne & J. Worrall (eds.), Rationality and Reality: Conversations with Alan Musgrave, Springer: Dordrecht, 2006, pp. 109-132.
  73. 'A Less Than Direct Connection Indeed: Reply to Jakowljevitsch', Divinatio 24 (2006), pp. 157-168.
  74. R. Nola and H. Sankey, Theories of Scientific Method: An Introduction, Philosophy and Science Series, Acumen: Chesham (2007) 384 pages.
  75. Review of Sherrilyn Roush, Tracking Truth: Knowledge, Evidence, and Science, Review of Metaphysics (2007) 61: 1, pp. 158-159.
  76. Scientific Realism and the Rationality of Science Ashgate: Aldershot (2008), 154 pages.
  77. L. Soler, H. Sankey, & P. Hoyningen-Huene, (eds.), Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison: Stabilities, Ruptures, Incommensurabilities? Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 255, Springer: Dordrecht (2008), 384 pages.
  78. 'Some Reflections on Experimental Incommensurability: Comment on Lena Soler', in Rethinking Scientific Change and Theory Comparison: Stabilities, Ruptures, Incommensurabilities?, pp. 341-347.
  79. 'Scientific Realism and the Inevitability of Science', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 39: 2 (2008), pp. 259-264.
  80. 'Scientific Method', in S. Psillos & M. Curd (eds.), The Routledge Companion To Philosophy of Science, Routledge, New York (2008), pp. 248-258.
  81. 'Scientific Realism and the Semantic Incommensurability Thesis', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A 40: 2 (2009), pp. 196-202.
  82. 'A Curious Disagreement: Response to Hoyningen-Huene and Oberheim', Studies in History and Philosophy of Science A 40: 2 (2009), pp. 210-212.
  83. Review of Stathis Psillos, Philosophy of Science: A-Z, Philosophy of Science 76: 1 (2009), pp. 115-117.
  84. 'Science, Common Sense and Reality', forthcoming in J. E. Ford (ed.), The Ontic Return: The Current Epochal Shift from Meaning to Being, Palgrave Macmillan.
  85. 'Incommensurability and Theory Change', forthcoming in S. Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism, Blackwell Publishing.
  86. 'Witchcraft, Relativism and the Problem of the Criterion' forthcoming Erkenntnis.

 

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